Raciocínio probatório e decisão judicial: a motivação de fatos na sentença penal como garantia fundamental do devido processo

Abstract

This thesis examines the possibility of evidentiary standards dispensing with the subjective assessment of the magistrate at the moment of deciding on the facts in criminal proceedings. It adopts a theoretical and analytical approach as its methodology, based on a critical bibliographic review and jurisprudential research. The research starts from the premise that, however rich and reliable the body of evidence may be, it is not possible to obtain complete knowledge of the facts, and precisely for this reason, judicial reasoning will be probabilistic. In this scenario of uncertainty, evidentiary standards emerge, which are rules of decision regarding the sufficiency of evidence. Theories based on the concept here called relative plausibility have attempted to formulate clear, precise, and objective evidentiary standards, with the intention of shielding the decision-making moment from any subjective interference. However, these theories fail because they employ, in the standards, terms that embody true evaluative concepts, therefore dependent on the interpretative activity of the judge. The thesis concludes that the working hypothesis was confirmed because this decision rule does not operate automatically, without the need for interpretation, but has the potential to function as an argumentative guide. By proposing an argumentative structure that guides judicial reasoning based on public and controllable reasons, the credibility of judicial institutions is strengthened, and it is revealed that factual reasoning, anchored in rational criteria of concrete evidence, functions as a fundamental guarantee of due process. This model, therefore, does not ensure full objectivity, but it provides more transparent and intersubjectively controllable decisions.