A legitimidade do reconhecimento facial de pessoas enquanto meio de prova no processo penal: qual é a sua real confiabilidade e legitimidade?

Abstract

The present study aims to problematize the fragility of personal recognition as a means of proof, from the perspective of the fallibility of human memory and the racist penal system. There are many cases of unfair convictions when it comes to facial recognition of people. Therefore, compliance with the requirements set out in article 226 of the CPP is essential and this is the understanding reached by the higher Courts. However, compliance with formalities, in most cases, is not sufficient to support the search for total efficiency of this means of proof. This is because there is no way to trust something that is already wrong, given the impossibility of being dependent on human memory, which is fallible, and a racist penal system. Furthermore, this means of proof demonstrated a clear violation of the principles of presumption of innocence and nemo tenetur se detegere. Still, initially, the fact was addressed that criticisms of this means of evidence are necessary and indispensable, however, these criticisms must be accompanied by an understanding that they are all linked to something developed in a historical moment completely different from the current one