Conjecturas e refutações em democracia: correção e legitimidade decisória na construção de uma solução adequada nos conflitos coletivos.

Abstract

The correct answer thesis is the subject of intense debates in the philosophy of law, and there is no consensus on its application. This article seeks to contribute to this debate from the perspective of Karl Popper's critical rationalism. The question to be faced refers to the possibility of finding the correct answer in collective litigation. The thesis of the correct answer is usually presented by the doctrine based on different assumptions, but that lead to a solipsistic decision by the judge, and that it would therefore be illegitimate, especially when it comes to collective litigation. In conclusion, the thesis was presented that decision legitimacy is as important as correct decision in a Democratic Rule of Law, and perhaps the only path that can lead to it, even if fate is not a definitive correct answer, but only provisional and subject to rebuttals.